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Globalization, as defined by Anthony Giddens (1990, p. 64), involves “the 
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way 
that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”  
This intensification of relations has made people more aware than ever of the diversity 
and complexity of social life in general and educational practices in particular, thanks in 
large part to the work of scholars of international and comparative education (Arnove, 
2013).  Such awareness produces two countervailing tendencies in thought and action 
about educational practices.  On the one hand, scholars have helped us understand and 
sympathize with the systematic cultural and social sources of this diversity, which 
makes us in turn hesitant to judge and to intervene in such practices.   
On the other, such awareness may arouse moral intuitions that lead us to believe 
that sometimes there is cause for judgment about and intervention into these practices, 
even though we may not have a clear understanding of why. In this article, we point out 
and begin to explore the philosophical resources that have been developed in the last 
twenty years or so that can help us reach normative judgments about global and 
international educational policies and practices in light of a detailed and sympathetic 
understanding of the circumstances in which they occur.  To do so, we first report two 
cases of educational exclusion based on sophisticated contextual research.  Second, we 
note a variety of recent philosophical perspectives that may be helpful in analyzing the 
normative status of such cases, focusing on two in particular—that of Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum.   
Third, we analyze the cases using these perspectives and consider how one 
might decide which perspectives would best apply when the conclusions of the analyses 
are different. Our intention is not to render final and complete normative judgments 
about these cases or about the philosophical perspectives under consideration.   Rather, 
                                                        
1 Correspondence: Robert F. Arnove, Indiana University, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies, 201 N. 
Rose Ave., Bloomington, IN 47405-1006; Email: arnove@indiana.edu 
Education as an Ethical Concern in the Global Era      77 
 
FIRE - Forum for International Research in Education 
we hope to make the reader aware of resources and methods of analysis that may be 
relevant to reaching such judgments. 
Below we examine two cases—the education of girls and the education of 
children within counterhegemonic social movements—to illustrate the challenges 
involved in formulating normative judgments about education policies and practices, 
while taking into account local cultural and sociopolitical contexts.  After providing 
brief sketches of the complex issues involved in these cases, we elaborate philosophical 
frameworks, apply them to the cases, and reflect on that application. 
 
Exemplary Cases 
The following cases raise socio-culturally complex and normative issues that 
nations and localities confront in distributing educational opportunities for all. 
 
The Education of Girls 
In Inexcusable Absence: Why 60 Million Girls Still Aren’t in School and What to Do 
about It, Maureen Lewis and Marlaine Lockheed (2006) note that among the many 
exclusions of children, such as for ethnicity, race, location (urban-rural), socioeconomic 
status, and caste, gender represents a “second burden.”  All such factors influence who 
attends school and how differently situated children fare with regard to academic 
achievement and life chances, that is, subsequent income, occupation, political power, 
and social status.  
Lewis and Lockheed (2006) briefly describe examples of the types of girls who 
remain out of school or have not completed it “nearly two decades after the worldwide 
declaration of ‘Education for All’”: 
 
Meera, 8, lives with her family on a sidewalk in New Delhi, India. During 
the day she roams major intersections, her infant sister hanging from her 
hip, begging drivers for coins . . . She does not go to a school. In a few 
years she will be married off to a stranger. She will have six children, one 
of whom will go to school. Or she will die young, possibly immolated in a 
kitchen fire for having brought with her an insufficient dowry. (p. 1) 
 
Wambuni, 14, goes to boarding school because no secondary school is 
available in her Kenyan village. But she will soon be expelled from school 
because she is pregnant, having been raped at school by boy students 
from another tribe, who considered it a mere prank. (p. 2) 
 
Others, however, have been able to defy the odds against their attending and 
completing schooling: 
 
Indrani, 10, is the daughter of illiterate parents living in rural 
Bangladesh. She goes to school. Her older sister is finishing secondary 
school and plans to work in the garment factory in the market center. 
While her mother was betrothed at 12, her parents have decided their 
daughters must finish school before marrying. (p. 2) 
 
These examples illustrate various factors cited by Lewis and Lockheed (2006) 
that create either barriers or opportunities for girls to attend schools and to complete 
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their education.  One set of constraining factors is cultural norms that relate to the 
purity of girls, whose honor reflects on that of the family and kinship groups.  Closely 
associated with these norms is a realistic concern with the safety of girls, especially if 
schools are located far away from home.  Sexual harassment and rape are, unfortunately, 
not uncommon occurrences.  In addition, the need for girls to assist with domestic 
chores and to provide a source of income are involved in family decisions to keep 
daughters at home.  Furthermore, labor market demand for girls enters into families’ 
cost-benefit considerations as to whether to send girls to higher levels of education 
systems. Government policies also affect whether or not adequate resources are 
provided for girls to gain access to and stay in school.  For example, one reason why 
families may send their daughters to school involves not only the distance required to 
travel to schools but also the availability of bathrooms, especially for adolescent girls, 
both of which are likely to result from government decisions about the location and 
amenities of schools. 
Despite these many obstacles and challenges, and in contexts as dangerous as 
Afghanistan, where schools and girls are targets for deadly attacks by the Taliban, 
parents often send their daughters to school.  They will do so if nearby schools respect 
local values and offer an education that is for both the soul and the world.  Careful 
ethnographic study of local contexts and their traditions, as conducted by Dana Burde 
(2014), shows that community-based schools operating in mosques with mullahs as 
teachers had a “stunning effect on children’s academic participation and performance 
and have tremendous potential for reducing existing inequities in access and gender 
participation in rural areas in Afghanistan” (p.144).  Religious schools offer a safe haven, 
where both girls and boys can acquire literacy skills and the basic foundation for 
continuing education in the public education system (for further discussion on literacy 
skills, see Street, 1995).   
What is occurring in Afghanistan is but one instance of how traditional 
education institutions may accord with universal norms advocating full human rights 
for females.  Depending on the interaction of global, national, and local forces, schools, 
whatever their origins, may or may not open opportunities for both boys and girls to 
continue with their education and be able to determine more promising futures for 
themselves and their communities (see, for example, Hoechner, 2015). 
In light of this and other research, there is a complex interaction between family, 
locality, school, culture, religion, economy, and government policy that determines 
whether, and to what extent, girls are able to attend school.  But despite this 
complexity, girls remain disadvantaged in their opportunities for school attendance and 
completion. 
 
Education within Counterhegemonic Social Movements 
Threats to religious and cultural norms or collective social identities pertain to 
educational opportunities and outcomes not only for girls but also for children in 
general.  An especially interesting set of challenges arises with regard to grassroots 
sociopolitical movements that challenge the existing power structure of a society and its 
education system, which is viewed as a mechanism for maintaining an unequal and 
unjust society.  Such “counterhegemonic” movements may establish their own school 
systems and also may try to establish autonomous self-governing regions, as with the 
Zapatista Movement in Chiapas, Mexico.  The schools under Zapatista control in 
Chiapas, as well as those established by the Landless Workers’ Movement in Brazil, 
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favor using the consciousness-raising pedagogy of the late Brazilian educator Paulo 
Freire.  His “pedagogy of the oppressed” involves a problem solving approach in which 
educators and students work together to name the forces that have prevented individual 
and collective self-realization; the philosophical underpinning of this pedagogy is 
designed to stimulate historically oppressed people to take action to create more 
democratic and egalitarian societies (Freire, 2000).   
Such action inevitably leads to hostile reactions from the government.  Within 
the counterhegemonic movements, therefore, it is not surprising to find a tendency to 
draw a boundary around those within the beleaguered community and to become 
exclusionary of outsiders.  Juan Berumen (2014), for example, points out that elders 
teach the children of Zapatista households not to affiliate with children from non-
Zapatista families.  The counterhegemonic schools established by these sociopolitical 
movements, in teaching the particular ideology of their movements, run the risk of 
becoming vehicles for indoctrinating students into a particular worldview, which will 
close off additional ways of seeing oneself in relation to others (Schugurensky & 
Madjidi, 2008, p. 119). 
The Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores rurais Sem 
Terra or MST), founded in 1984, offers a particularly interesting case of the tensions 
inherent in a progressive movement attempting to democratize the economy and polity 
using egalitarian land rights and an emancipatory education system.  Since its inception 
in 1984, MST has become the most extensive grassroots movement in Latin America, 
with a membership of more than 1.5 million in 23 of the 26 states in Brazil.  In 
conjunction with its organizing activities to gain land titles for the formerly 
dispossessed, it has created a wide network of approximately 2,500 schools (grades 1-8) 
with over 150,000 children and over 1,200 teachers (many trained by the MST).  The 
movement teaches adult literacy classes and operates secondary technical schools with 
an agrarian focus and a Popular University of Social Movements (PUSM) named after a 
renowned Brazilian Marxist Scholar, Florestan Fernandes (ALAI, 2005; Caldart and the 
Movement of Landless Workers, 2012; McCowan & Puggian, 2010; and Motta, 2014). 
According to Roseli Salete Caldart and the Movement of Landless Workers 
(2012): 
 
Our schools promote values that are different from the anti-human 
capitalist society, especially in its neoliberal version: individualism, 
consumerism, and egoism.  Our values include solidarity, doing things 
for others, the capacity to be angry at injustice and suffering, the 
satisfaction of being part of a working class, a confidence in the process 
to construct one’s own destiny and overcoming our inferiority complex, 
commitment to collective values and a belief in humanity.  There are also 
major challenges, including overcoming macho and racist attitudes, 
respecting differences and helping those with special needs. (p. 78) 
 
These are noble goals indeed.  Yet, it is also necessary to be alert to the 
possibilities that in the very process of producing a “new social subject,” MST locks 
children into predetermined roles within a bounded community and into one way of 
viewing the world through a particular ideological lens.  The following statement 
underscores the concerns with a tendency toward pedagogical practices that appear to 
contradict essential Freirean principles of an emancipatory education: 
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We need to pay attention to childhood among the Landless and the 
pedagogical care that is devoted to children.  It is significant the children 
have adopted the name Sem Terra (Landless) to call themselves Sem 
Terrinha (little people without land).  The suffix –inha in Portuguese is an 
expression of affection and size.  This expresses a feeling that we too 
want to be part of the Landless movement, but we don’t want to stop 
being children.  But we’re not just children, we’re Sem Terrinha!  We are 
Sem Terrinha with love.  That is how we want to be cared for by the 
Movement.  The demand for love and care is a universal right of children 
and young people in education. (Caldart and the Movement of Landless 
Workers, 2012, p. 82) 
 
Philosophical Frameworks 
These cases of the educational exclusion of girls and of children in 
counterhegemonic movements are contextually complex, and they demand a normative 
response to determine whether those within these societies and elsewhere have a moral 
obligation to accept or intervene in the policies and practices they include.  The 
traditional western approaches to morality have tended to be both universalistic and 
comprehensive.  John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism, Immanuel Kant’s deontological (non-
consequentialist) ethics, and Aristotle’s virtue ethics, for example, propose standards for 
moral judgment and action that apply to all human beings, or are universal.  This 
universalism is a feature that is required for making judgments about those who live in 
other societies and cultures.  Moreover, these approaches are also comprehensive in 
their application, that is, they render universal judgments about all possible actions, 
policies, and practices and do not make room for individuals or cultures to reach 
different judgments about some aspects of their own lives.   
This comprehensive characteristic of the traditional approaches led some social 
scientists in the early twentieth century (e.g., Ruth Benedict, 1934) to adopt a culturally 
relative approach to morality.  On this account, an act is morally right or wrong just 
insofar as the culture of the person who judges that act deems it to be right or wrong.  
This relativistic doctrine seems to authorize cultures to make their own judgments of 
morality and thus seems superficially to express respect for those cultures.  But on 
closer examination, it does no such thing.  Instead, it holds that the members of one 
culture that judge an action or practice to be wrong are justified in condemning the 
members of another culture who engage in that action or practice, and if the members of 
the first culture believe it right to oppress or even kill the members of the second 
culture as a result, the members of the first culture are morally justified in doing so.  In 
other words and despite initial appearances, cultural relativism does not make respect 
for others a universal obligation.  What is needed for respecting others is a 
universalistic not a relativistic doctrine.  But, seemingly, these traditional universal 
western models are also comprehensive and provide no room for the agency and 
judgment of individuals or cultures. 
However, these two characteristics of the traditional western approaches to 
morality—universality and comprehensiveness—do not logically imply one another.  
That is, a moral doctrine can be comprehensive in that it specifies evaluations of all 
possible actions, but it need not, therefore, hold that these evaluations are correct for all 
moral agents, but only, for example, for the members of a particular community.  In 
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other words, a doctrine can be comprehensive but not universal.  Similarly, a doctrine 
can hold that certain values are universal but that other values rightly depend on the 
judgments that individuals or communities make.  Such a doctrine is universal but not 
comprehensive.   
In fact, this latter approach to morality has been of interest to several 
philosophers in the west since the middle of the twentieth century until today.  Indeed, 
this approach offers a potentially attractive way of thinking about moral issues that 
arise across cultures, like those in the cases we have described.  This approach holds 
that some values are universal and thus that a society or person that violates those 
values is subject to moral condemnation and possibly to external intervention.  
However, it also holds that other values are rightfully subject to the judgments of each 
person or each culture, and thus it respects the judgments that persons or cultures make 
about those values as long as those persons or societies do not violate a universal value 
in expressing or pursuing those values. 
The philosophers who have developed versions of this approach include John 
Rawls, Amy Gutmann, Amartya Sen, and Martha Nussbaum.  Rawls (1993) labels his 
approach political liberalism, which aims to determine a society-wide political consensus 
about justice that nevertheless allows individuals to reach judgments about values that 
are not implicated in justice.  Gutmann and Thompson (1996) call their approach 
deliberative democracy, and it permits disagreement about some social values about 
which citizens are not yet able to agree and authorizes communities and individuals to 
make judgments about values that do not affect the society’s ability to deliberate 
democratically about matters of collective concern.  Both Sen (2009) and Nussbaum 
(2006) have developed different versions of what they call the capabilities approach.  For 
Sen, the capabilities that matter are those that very generally enable people to be and do 
what they have reason to value, but beyond distributing those capabilities in ways that 
are not patently unjust, societies, he holds, are able to determine democratically their 
own conceptions of justice.   For Nussbaum, there are ten specific central capabilities 
that all societies are obliged to distribute to their citizens up to a particular threshold, 
although societies have the ability to realize those capabilities in multiple ways, and the 
capabilities themselves enable individuals to make their own judgments about the use of 
the capabilities and aspects of their lives that do not affect the societies’ ability to 
distribute the capabilities justly. 
 
The Philosophies of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum 
Although the approaches of Rawls and Gutmann are important and powerful in 
their own ways and can be used appropriately to analyze cases that raise normative 
issues in specific contexts, in the remainder of this paper we will focus on the work of 
Sen and Nussbaum, in significant part because that work was developed explicitly in and 
for the international context.  We will first describe each approach in turn and then 
consider their application to the cases we have described above. 
Sen (1999) first developed the capability approach as a critique of the utilitarian 
normative basis of traditional western economics and its use in policies aimed at the 
development and improvement of societies, particularly those in the developing world.  
Traditional western economics aims at the maximization of the sum total of preference 
satisfaction experienced by human beings.  Sen observed, however, that some 
preferences are adapted to the severely deprived situations in which some people find 
themselves.  Such adaptive preferences do not reflect people’s moral judgments about 
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their lives but rather their resignation to make the best of a terrible situation.  As a 
result, people’s satisfactions do not necessarily reflect what is morally good or right, and 
the maximization of satisfaction does not necessarily indicate that the morally best 
arrangements have been achieved.  Instead, Sen suggested, what has more salient and 
universal normative value to people is whether they have the capabilities to be and do 
what they have reason to value, and that this concept is more appropriate as a general 
criterion of social development than traditional economists’ maximization of satisfaction 
as measured by national income.  Although human capabilities to do and be what they 
have reason to value are Sen’s basis for normative judgment, he does not think it 
appropriate to spell out in detail what specific capabilities should be developed in all 
societies for two reasons.  First, he argued, there is universal agreement about what 
specific deprivations of capabilities constitute genuine injustices—such things as high 
mortality rates, severe political oppression, extreme deprivation of civil rights, 
starvation, grinding poverty, and so on.  Under these and other conditions, people are 
manifestly not free to pursue lives that they have reason to value.  People in any culture, 
he says, perceive the injustice of such circumstances, and thus people have a universal 
and intuitive sense of injustice that identifies specific arrangements and circumstances 
that are to be condemned, avoided, and corrected.  But, second, there is no universal 
agreement about the ideals for which all societies should strive (Sen, 2009).  Rather, 
such constructive accounts of justice are to be developed by people in particular societies 
deliberating collectively about what makes the most sense to pursue, given their 
particular beliefs, practices, and circumstances.  In this way, Sen’s conception of ethical 
value is universal but not comprehensive. 
Nussbaum (2006), by contrast, does believe that there are specific capabilities 
that can be universally agreed on and that, therefore, all societies should pursue at least 
up to a threshold of adequacy.  These capabilities fall into ten general categories: (1) life; 
(2) bodily health; (3) bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination, and thought; (5) emotions; 
(6) practical reason; (7) affiliation; (8) other species; (9) play; and (10) control over one’s 
environment, both political and material.  This list of central human capabilities is the 
result of cross-cultural discussions about what is necessary for people to live a life of 
dignity.  It is revisable in light of further thought and discussion; that is, other 
capabilities may be added, some may be deleted from the list, and some may be 
described differently.  Nevertheless, Nussbaum asserts that humans subscribe to a 
universal conception of the capabilities that are of normative importance.  Some of what 
individual persons value may not appear on this list, and people are to be free not to 
exercise particular capabilities on the list if they judge them to be unimportant to 
realizing their individual conceptions of the good.  But societies have a universal moral 
obligation to develop the central capabilities of all their citizens, whether individual 
citizens choose to exercise them or not.  Nussbaum characterizes her approach as a type 
of Rawlsian political liberalism, in that it provides a foundation for all people to use in 
developing and pursuing their own conceptions of the good, a foundation that 
constitutes a partial and limited universal conception of normative values that leaves 
people free to judge what else is valuable beyond these specific capabilities.  Thus, 
Nussbaum, too, holds a conception of ethical value that is universal but not 
comprehensive. 
 
The Application of the Philosophies to the Exemplary Cases 
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Both Nussbaum and Sen judge that the educational deprivation of girls described 
above violates universal values, but for somewhat different reasons that imply 
significantly different normative responses.  Sen (1999) sees girls’ deprivation from a 
basic education as, first, inherently a form of patent injustice.  To him, any reasonable 
human being would find the extreme forms of educational deprivation described above 
to be obviously and intuitively unjust in themselves.  And beyond this, such educational 
deprivations are empirically connected to other forms of patent injustice, such as 
poverty, political oppression, and high child mortality.  Thus, the extreme forms of 
educational deprivation for girls are both directly and indirectly unjust.  And they, 
therefore, provide an important curtailment of people’s freedom to do and be what they 
have reason to value.  For Sen, the normatively appropriate response to such 
deprivation is, first, to provide girls the basic education that is inherently required by 
our universal sense of injustice and, second, to provide beyond that forms of education 
that will prevent or correct other patent forms of injustice.   
For Nussbaum (2006), there is an educational dimension of all the central 
capabilities in her list.  For example, human beings must learn how to preserve their 
lives and to take care of their bodies because for our species such activities do not occur 
spontaneously and innately.  Thus, even for the capabilities that seem most dependent 
on the provision of material resources, there is a clear educational component that 
involves individuals learning to use those resources successfully.  For that reason, 
educational deprivation, although not the only source of the failure to develop people’s 
central capabilities, is arguably the most significant in that it affects all of the 
capabilities needed to live lives with dignity.  Thus, the denial of basic education as well 
as the more sophisticated forms of education needed; for example, to develop 
imagination and practical reason represent widely ramified forms of injustice.  For 
Nussbaum, the normatively appropriate response goes beyond the provision of Sen’s 
basic and instrumentally valuable forms of education.  Rather, it includes the provision 
of a highly sophisticated education to all, an education that, among other things, 
develops their capabilities for citizenship, their ability to formulate arguments, their 
deep knowledge of and empathy with others who have different ways of living, and their 
narrative imaginations (Nussbaum, 2010). 
It may be that we have overstated the educational differences between Sen and 
Nussbaum.  Sen does think there are reasons to educate for more than basic literacy, and 
Nussbaum is sensitive to cultural differences.  But Sen also emphasizes the importance 
of giving those from diverse societies the right to shape democratically their own ways 
of life, including their own ways of education.  And Nussbaum seems to provide a much 
more robust (and therefore invasive) account of the universal values involved in justice, 
including the values that apply to societies’ educational provisions.  
This difference in perspectives also creates distinctive approaches to the cases of 
education in counterhegemonic social movements.  The critical issues for Sen are, first, 
whether the education provided encompasses what is required to correct the inherent 
and instrumental sources of injustice that children and their families confront and, 
second, whether the elements of the education provided that go beyond these basics 
have been democratically determined by the community.  On the one hand, it appears 
that the education provided by the Zapatistas and the Landless Workers’ Movement, 
because of its basis in Freire’s thinking, is likely to include what is universally 
acknowledged to be needed to overcome educational injustice.  For example, liberatory 
literacy and a basic and impartial understanding of how the natural and social worlds 
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operate in these contexts are likely to be included in such education.  However, further 
investigation is necessary to determine whether this appearance is confirmed in reality.  
On the other hand, in both movements the ideological education provided goes beyond 
these basics.  For Sen, the crucial issue is whether the content of that ideological 
education has been democratically determined by the relevant community.  The 
segregation of Zapatista children from others does not by itself provide an answer about 
whether the content and process of such education are democratically determined.  After 
all, Sen argues that educational systems may and should be different as long as they are 
not patently unjust and as long as they reflect the open deliberation of the community.  
Here, too, additional investigation is needed to ascertain how the nature of the 
education provided to these children was decided upon originally and how it now can be 
changed.  If such decision and control procedures are sufficiently democratic, the 
resulting ideological education satisfies Sen’s normative requirements, but if they are 
not, a corrective response is appropriate. 
Nussbaum would take a more critical perspective on these instances of 
counterhegemonic education.  The Freirean aspects of education in these cases would 
meet many of Nussbaum’s requirements for an education for human dignity, in 
particular the expectation that the education helps to produce self-respect and a critical, 
inquiring perspective on the world.  Nussbaum, however, would be concerned about the 
tendencies of these kinds of education to produce an unquestioning acceptance of an 
ideology and an unfamiliarity with the ideas, understandings, and aspirations of those 
outside of one’s immediate community.  The central capabilities require people to be 
reasonably critical of their own community’s assumptions and to adopt their own 
conceptions of the good in light of their understanding of a reasonable range of 
alternatives for acting and judging.  But here, too, these characterizations are only 
logical possibilities that follow from the extant descriptions of these movements and 
their approaches to education.  An empirical examination of the particular issues of 
interest to Nussbaum would be important for reaching a final conclusion about the 
normative acceptability of such an education.  This examination would inquire into 
whether and how the education provided engages and develops each of the ten central 
capabilities and whether there are aspects of how the education is provided that tend to 
discourage the sort of independent thinking and self-determination that is the hallmark 
of Nussbaum’s education for human dignity. 
 
A Brief Reflection on the Perspectives 
Despite these differences in Sen’s and Nussbaum’s perspectives on justice and 
education, they both have a genuine regard for the empirical.  For them, normative 
analysis is not an armchair activity, but rather one that requires careful investigation of 
empirical events and normative practices.  Such investigation is something that requires 
the skills of both social scientists and philosophers. 
Philosophical theories can be powerful sources of normative analysis for two 
reasons.  First, the best of such perspectives offers a wide view of the issues that are 
involved in the formation of normative judgments, one not limited to the interests that 
may happen to occur to particular persons or in particular communities.  Second, 
philosophical perspectives usually consider what may be persuasively justified to others, 
not only what appears intuitively right to individuals or societies.  For example, Sen has 
argued persuasively that normative value is not only a matter of what people have and 
what satisfactions they experience but also of what people can be or do.  In fact, he 
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contends that something that one has or experiences is valuable only to the extent that 
it affects what one can be or do (Sen, 1999).  In that way, he has widened the normative 
perspective of, for example, classical economics to include concerns about not only 
possessions and satisfactions but also opportunities and capabilities.  Following this 
lead, Martha Nussbaum, while working on the issues that women experience in India 
and other developing nations, argued that there are specific capability deprivations that 
women confront and that must be corrected in order to achieve justice.  Here, too, 
traditional ideas about what is of normative value have been widened to include 
particular capabilities, not just capabilities in general, as Sen had done.  Both Sen and 
Nussbaum have provided powerful arguments for such expansions of our ideas about 
normative value.   
However, it is important to notice that these expansions were made in specific 
contexts, the context of classical economics for Sen and the context of women’s 
maltreatment for Nussbaum.  As a result, neither perspective should be reasonably 
understood as generating an all-purpose conception of justice that is detachable from 
specific contexts.  Indeed, we suggest that these and other perspectives on justice have 
just such contextual strengths and limitations.  As a result, none of these perspectives—
those of Sen and Nussbaum as well as others we have not elaborated on here, such as 
Rawls and Gutmann—should be understood as legitimately making final and context-
free claims about what is normatively valuable.  Therefore, the criterion they must meet 
is whether they provide plausible sources of enlightenment about particular normative 
problems, not whether they are true for all times and places.  In other words, these 
perspectives at best provide possibly useful tools of analysis for particular normative 
issues, and we must judge whether they are useful for the particular problems we 
confront.  Thus, Nussbaum’s perspective may be particularly helpful in understanding 
and responding to issues of the dignity and fair treatment of women and girls because of 
the context in which that perspective was developed.  Sen’s, by contrast, is particularly 
helpful in understanding and responding to issues of cultural freedom because the 
economic practices against which his theory was developed violates the freedom of 
individuals and cultures to live lives they have reason to value. 
In light of these reflections, the value of an awareness of the detailed social and 
cultural context of a particular policy or practice to normative analysis is twofold.  First, 
it helps determine the appropriateness and applicability of a particular philosophical 
perspective to the issues at hand.  That is, the context in which a philosophical 
perspective was developed should reasonably match the context and content of the 
policy or practice to be judged normatively.  And, second, an awareness of the social and 
cultural context is a source of the factual premises upon which such perspectives are to 
be deployed in analyzing those issues.  Thus, recent philosophical work can help flesh 
out and justify our moral intuitions about the globalizing world if our awareness of the 
context is fully operative in determining what philosophical perspective we bring to 
bear and what features of the context we use in reaching our considered judgments 
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